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1.  Introduction 
 
Several economists familiar with New Keynesian models have argued that these models 
imply that money growth determines inflation in the long run.  For example, Ireland 
(2004, p. 979) concluded an analysis of an estimated New Keynesian model by observing 
that “the monetary authority must choose the steady-state rate of inflation, which is 
ultimately determined by the rate of nominal money growth…”  Woodford (2007), 
however, argues that economists who believe that money growth determines inflation in 
the long run in New Keynesian models do so because of their own “misunderstanding” of 
how these models work.  In this paper I provide a rebuttal to this argument and make the 
case that, in New Keynesian models, money growth indeed determines inflation in the 
long run.  I do not want this discussion to overshadow substantial areas of agreement with 
Woodford (2007), so I state those areas of agreement first and explore their implications 
for work on monetary policy.  The areas of agreement are covered in Section 2, and the 
long-run money growth/inflation relationship is the subject of Section 3.  Section 4 
considers possible objections, and Section 5 provides brief concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Areas of agreement  
 
Three major areas of agreement with Woodford are on (1) emphasizing the contribution 
of monetarism to present-day monetary analysis; (2) the false leads provided by some 
advocates of monetary aggregates; and (3) distinguishing money and credit.  What 
follows is not a simple catalogue of agreement.  Instead, my intention is to bring out 
some points not covered by Woodford: connections of monetarism to New Keynesian 
economics beyond those he listed; common elements in Woodford’s (2007) views on 
money and credit, and those in the monetarist literature; and how the criticism of New 
Keynesian models made by Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001), though motivated by 
appealing to the quantity theory of money, actually finds no support in the work of 
Milton Friedman. 
 
2.1 Contributions of monetarism 
 
While the topic of Woodford’s paper is “How Important Is Money in the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy?,” his Section 1 deals with “The Historical Significance of 
Monetarism.”  It is very appropriate that a discussion of money’s present status should 
begin with a discussion of monetarism.  It is as natural and essential to consider   2
monetarism in a discussion of today’s role for money as it is to consider the Great 
Inflation in a discussion of the Great Moderation.  Many of the policymaking principles 
put into practice in major countries today are inherited from ideas articulated by 
monetarists during earlier periods.  Moreover, the durability of monetarist ideas is also 
manifested in research that improves upon and extends New Keynesian models.  The 
study by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003) is a leading example of the productive 
interaction of the monetarist literature and state-of-the-art modeling.  Their work 
proposes several modifications to a New Keynesian baseline model, with the added 
model elements inspired by the desire to test hypotheses advanced in the monetarist 
literature.  The result is a much more rigorous foundation for the frictions mentioned in 
monetarist work than achieved in the existing New Keynesian, or any preceding, 
literature.  Another example of a productive synthesis of the monetarist literature and 
modern macroeconomic modeling is that in Dotsey and King (2005, pp. 214, 227), who 
connect the properties of their state-dependent pricing model to the list of empirical 
propositions about the effects of monetary policy given in Friedman (1987). 
 
Clarifying the enduring contribution of monetarism is especially important because many 
prior discussions provide quite a misleading picture.  I find the contributions of Alan 
Blinder and Willem Buiter to be particularly interesting in illustrating the problems of 
correctly disentangling the legacy of monetarism.  These authors hold special positions in 
that they both contributed prominent papers on the Keynesian side during the years of 
Keynesian-monetarist debate (see Blinder and Solow, 1973; Tobin and Buiter, 1976).  
Moreover, they both later served as monetary policy makers (on the Federal Open Market 
Committee in Blinder’s case; on the United Kingdom’s Monetary Policy Committee in 
Buiter’s case) in an era where policymaking and monetary policy thinking had more or 
less reached their modern-day configuration.  Given this background, it might seem that 
these authors are in an ideal position to judge how monetarism has contributed to modern 
policymaking and to present-day views of monetary policy.  But I find, on the contrary, 
that these two authors’ writings, in contrast to Woodford (2007), give an unhelpful 
account of the enduring contributions of monetarism.  Both Blinder and Buiter could 
have done much more by way of acknowledging the extent to which monetarist 
propositions have become standard. 
 
The problem with Blinder’s accounts is that while he emphasizes the durability of 
Keynesian economics (see, for example, Blinder, 1984, 1987), he fails to acknowledge 
the influence monetarism has had even on the development of his own views.  The fact is   3
that, at the same time that big movements in velocity got all the publicity in the 1980s, 
and so produced many “monetarism is dead” judgments, key aspects of the monetarist-
Keynesian debate were being tacitly settled on the monetarists’ terms.  This capitulation 
on Keynesians’ part is as evident in Blinder’s work as much as anyone’s.  For example, 
Baumol and Blinder (1979, p. 288), taking a Keynesian perspective, argued that “demand 
fluctuations are not the only cause of inflation, and, in particular, they have played a 
rather minor role in the inflation we have been experiencing since 1973.”  Moreover, to 
the extent that Baumol and Blinder acknowledged a role for demand in determining 
inflation, they saw it as working via a permanent-trade-off Phillips curve, not a Phillips 
curve embedding long-run natural-rate properties: “the inference that therefore the trade-
off no longer exists was, and still is, unwarranted” (1979, p. 287).  In Baumol and Blinder 
(1982, pp. 301−303), however, this discussion was dropped in favor of an exposition of 
the temporary nature of the trade-off and of the tendency for the economic system to 
return to the natural rate of unemployment.  Another example of monetarists’ influence 
on Blinder (and on the profession) deals with the issue of lags in effect of monetary 
policy.  Blinder (1984) rejected the Friedman dictum that “inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon” and suggested that it was contradicted by the fact 
that inflation in specified periods did not move in the same direction as same-period 
money growth.  Blinder (1997), by contrast, argues that the lag in the effect of monetary 
policy is a very important consideration that must be taken into account. 
 
Whereas Blinder tends to describe as “Keynesian” the set of views that he has converged 
to in the wake of the Keynesian-monetarist debate, Buiter (2003) tends to attribute to 
James Tobin the aspects of the modern monetary policy framework that Buiter likes.  
Moreover, Buiter casts monetarism in negative terms, building Tobin up by attributing to 
monetarists views they did not hold and giving Tobin credit he happens not to deserve.  
So Buiter attributes to Milton Friedman the view that money demand is interest inelastic, 
a view to which Friedman clearly did not subscribe,
1 while Buiter claims that the modern 
monetary policy framework is in keeping with Tobin’s views, which it clearly is not.  In 
fact, Tobin was a longtime advocate of nonmonetary approaches to the analysis and 
control of inflation (see Nelson and Schwartz, 2008, pp. 841−842), and such 




1 See, for example, Friedman (1972).   4
These examples show that it is hard to determine the influence of monetarism because 
several of Friedman’s critics tended to adopt his positions without explicitly conceding 
defeat.  Woodford’s balanced evaluation of the historical significance of monetarism is a 
valuable tonic.  It should be noted, however, that there is an aspect of monetarist analysis 
that is still discussed in the literature today and is covered in Woodford’s paper, but 
which does not appear in his section on the legacy of monetarism.  This is the view that 
monetary policy operates through a spectrum of asset prices and that the effect of 




It is difficult to disagree with Woodford’s contention that the literature has not provided a 
satisfactory microfoundation for why money should be a good proxy for asset price 
variation, and so why money has a role as an index of the determinants of aggregate 
demand beyond short-term interest rates.
3 But I believe that finding such a 
microfoundation is an important priority in the modeling of money, because the empirical 
evidence is supportive of money having that role.  One can take one’s pick among recent 
empirical studies of money like Leeper and Roush (2003), Reynard (2006), Favara and 
Giordani (2007), Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2007), and Castelnuovo (2008).  
But whichever of these studies one finds most convincing, I believe that between them 
they have established that money has explanatory power for output and inflation beyond 
what the standard New Keynesian model predicts money should have, and exhibits this 
power across a number of different monetary policy regimes.  In a standard model as 
exemplified by Woodford’s equation (2.10) or in equation (4) below, any movement in 
real money balances not attributable to current output or current short-term interest-rate 
variations is just extraneous noise—the money demand disturbance.  Evidence that 
money has considerable marginal value as an indicator of future output and inflation 
variations contradicts the standard New Keynesian characterization of the behavior of 
money balances. 
 
2.2 False leads from advocates of money 
 
Woodford writes that the statements about modern models made by Alvarez, Lucas, and 
———————————————————————————————————— 
2 Brunner and Meltzer often emphasized this channel (see, for example, Brunner and Meltzer, 1976).  See 
also Friedman (1972, pp. 944−945) and Friedman and Schwartz (1982, pp. 56−57) for related discussions.  
3 For a recent generalization of New Keynesian models that goes in this direction, see Canzoneri et al 
(2008).   5
Weber (2001) are “incorrect.”  He is right to criticize Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber in such 
blunt terms.  Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber proceed from the false (and undocumented) 
premise that New Keynesian models (and/or modern monetary policymaking) reject the 
quantity theory.  The series of misstatements of fact in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber’s 
introduction should shatter any illusion that their subsequent discussion will either be a 
well-informed critique of existing models, or an authoritative road-map of where 
monetary policy modeling should go; and not surprisingly, what follows in Alvarez, 
Lucas, and Weber (2001) provides neither of these things.   
 
Follow-up work on the part of one of the authors of Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001) 
has persuaded me that the weakness of their critique stems not only from insufficient 
familiarity with New Keynesian work, but from inadequate consultation of the monetarist 
literature.
4 Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008) study the sluggish behavior of inflation 
and use a regularity in the data as a metric for this sluggish behavior.  The regularity in 
question is the short-run near-perfect negative correlation between money growth and 
velocity growth (a correlation which fades to zero at longer horizons).  Judging from their 
lack of references to previous literature, I presume that Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond 
regard themselves as having discovered this regularity.  I am at a loss how to persuade 
these authors that this is not the case, if reference to the monetarist literature is regarded 
as out of bounds.  A moment’s consideration should make it clear how unlikely it is that 
the older monetarists, after decades’ study of the behavior of money and velocity and of 
the lag from money growth to inflation, never discovered this regularity and noted it.  In 
fact, monetarists did note this regularity on many occasions.
5 New Keynesians can 
legitimately doubt that work on money like Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008) 




4 Of course, one of the authors of Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001), Robert Lucas, is steeped in the 
monetarist tradition.  But monetarist authors are not cited in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001); and the key 
misstatements in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber would not be supported by the core monetarists.  For example, 
Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001, p. 219) assert that the position that “inflation can be reduced by 
increasing short-term interest rates” is “a rejection of the quantity theory.”  By contrast, Milton Friedman 
once said, “if you really want to lower interest rates, the way to do it is by starting out to raise them” 
(quoted in Crawford, 1970). 
5 For example, Friedman (1983, p. 10): with “the lag in the effect of monetary change, ... velocity always 
tends to fall in the early stages of a monetary explosion.”  As noted above, a recent example of a study of 
the lags in effect of monetary policy that does take note of Friedman’s contributions in the area is Dotsey 
and King (2005).   6
2.3 Money vs. credit 
 
I have nothing but agreement with Woodford that an emphasis on credit frictions, or on 
the volume of bank credit, should not be regarded in any way as a sound rationale for 
looking at monetary aggregates.  In fact, the discussion at the end of Woodford’s Section 
2 can be thought of as a parallel to Milton Friedman (1972, p. 929) observation: “There is 
no necessary connection between a change in the quantity of money and in the volume of 
outstanding debts…”  Distinguishing between money and credit was a central part of the 
core monetarist literature,
6 and Woodford’s Section 2 amounts to an endorsement of that 
position.  To treat money and credit as automatically linked, or as variables that are 
naturally treated together (as suggested by the title of Hauser and Brigden (2002), 
“Money and Credit in an Inflation-Targeting Regime,” as well as the text of their paper) 
is to ride off in the wrong direction. 
 
It may be worth setting out in slightly more detail, in a manner that complements 
Woodford’s discussion, just how separate money and credit are.  Even if money and 
credit were linked rigidly in an accounting sense, that would not justify treating the two 
together, just as (e.g.) accounting identities linking saving and investment do not imply 
these series should always be treated together.  But in any case, money and credit are not 
linked rigidly by bivariate identities.  Some important monetary aggregates—currency 
and monetary base—do not include deposits at all; most deposit-inclusive monetary 
aggregates (including M2) do not include all types of deposit; and not all bank liabilities 
are deposits.  Moving to the asset side, earning assets of banks can be treated 
synonymously with “bank credit” only if one defines credit as including loans to the 
public sector (e.g., banks’ investments in Treasury securities).  And no matter how wide 
the definition of bank credit, there are many channels of credit (to both the private and 
public sectors) outside the deposit-taking banking system. 
 
For broad measures of money and for measures of credit restricted to cover earning assets 
of those institutions whose deposit liabilities are included in the monetary aggregate, the 
relationship between money and credit will be closest.  But even then, the identities that 
connect the two series are not such as to make one confident that the two variables will 
move together.  The reason is that money and credit are not the only nonnegligible terms 
in these identities; there are invariably extra variables that can and do produce 
———————————————————————————————————— 
6 Including Brunner and Meltzer (1976).   7
discrepancies between money and credit.  The position that money and credit move 
rigidly together therefore rests on an illegitimate ceteris paribus assumption regarding the 
additional endogenous terms that appear in the relevant identities. 
 
Moreover, banks’ historical involvement in lending activities not listed on their balance 
sheets reinforces the presumption that money and credit creation will have a loose 
relationship.  In the United States, regulations on banking activity led in the past to now 
well-publicized efforts on the part of commercial banks to participate in the spread of 
what Bernanke (2008) describes as “credit products and special-purpose investment 
vehicles” that were “circumventing the need for traditional bank financing.”  Though not 
categorized as balance-sheet items by banks, these vehicles sometimes did, as Bernanke 
notes, entail bank involvement in an advisory or underwriting capacity.
7 The channeling 
of banking business into off-balance-sheet activity was a prominent instance of credit 
expansion becoming further disconnected from deposit expansion. 
 
Several aspects of the experience with monetary aggregates in major economies also 
suggest that the value of monetary aggregates does not come from any accounting 
relations with credit.  First, base money and currency aggregates often outperform 
broader aggregates as indicators (e.g. in predictive power, or marginal predictive power, 
for output and inflation).  Second, a much larger share of corporate lending is 
intermediated through banks in the euro area than in the United States (see e.g. De Fiore 
and Uhlig, 2005), but the previously-cited papers provide (when considered in total) 
favorable results regarding money using data for both economies.  Third, commercial 
banks in the United Kingdom over the 1950s and 1960s and into the early 1970s 
generally refrained both from mortgage lending and from lending for corporate 
investment in physical capital; but broad monetary aggregates tended to have better 
relations with major macroeconomic variables in those years than they did subsequently, 
when the scope of bank lending broadened considerably. 
 
———————————————————————————————————— 
7 Similar behavior by banks for the purpose of avoiding regulation had been observed in other countries.  
See, for example, Battelino and McMillan (1989, pp. 136−138) on Australian commercial banks’ efforts 
during the 1980s to expand their involvement in the credit market by methods that did not involve deposit 
creation.   8
3.  Money growth and inflation in the long run 
 
Many specialists on monetary policy issues view inflation in the long run as pinned down 
by money growth in the long run.  Woodford notes that I argued along those lines myself 
in Nelson (2003) and that I claimed that the steady-state properties of New Keynesian 
models supported such a view.  Woodford (2007, p. 13) states, “But this is a 
misunderstanding.”  In this section, I make the case that such a view does not reflect a 
misunderstanding, but instead an attempt to take into account basic properties about the 
effect of monetary policy in the long run.  I first present a version of Woodford’s critique 
that is convenient for later discussion (Section 3.1).  Then I discuss the properties of the 
economy in the steady state (Sections 3.2 and 3.3), and on that basis defend the 
proposition that money growth does actually determine inflation in the long run (Section 
3.4).  
 
3.1 Determination of steady-state inflation 
 
Woodford’s approach can be thought of as one of counting equations and unknowns in a 
New Keynesian model.  Woodford notes that a version of the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve is (his equation (2.1), p. 6): 
 
(πt – πt*) = κ log(Yt / Yt
n) + βEt(πt+1 – πt+1*) + ut     (1) 
 
where πt is quarterly inflation, Yt is the level of output, Yt
n is the natural level of output, ut 
is a zero-mean Phillips curve shock, κ > 0, and 0 < β < 1; and πt* is the steady-state 
inflation rate.   
 
The time subscript in πt* allows the steady-state rate of inflation to vary across periods; it 
appears in the Phillips curve due to assumed continuous indexation of nominal price 
contracts to steady-state inflation.  As Woodford notes, the time-variation in the steady-
state inflation rate reflects fluctuations in the central bank’s inflation target.  Allowing the 
inflation target to vary over time makes the policy rule more general;
8 in particular, the 
———————————————————————————————————— 
8 More general, that is, in the sense that shifts in the steady-state inflation rate have occurred historically so 
that a policy rule that recognizes this could be more realistic as a description of historical experience.  
Other aspects of the realism of this specification may be questioned, however.  In particular, the monetary 
authorities of the United States and other countries in the 1970s denied that inflation was a monetary 
phenomenon; so while whatever monetary policy actions they took inevitably implied a certain steady-  9
generalization accommodates nonstationary behavior of inflation.  The generalization 
does imply that one cannot speak of a constant, steady-state rate of inflation.  But the 
generalization does not appear to bear materially on the question of whether money 
growth determines inflation in the long run.  For example, Woodford’s (2007) discussion 
uses the time-varying-target version of the New Keynesian model to dispute 
interpretations about inflation determination made in papers that assumed a constant 
inflation target.
9 It seems appropriate to conclude that Woodford’s argument that money 
growth does not pin down inflation in the long run does not depend on his assumption of 
a time-varying target inflation rate.  So for simplicity I assume that πt* is constant. 
 







t+1)] –σ[Rt – Etπt+1 – rt
n],         (2) 
 
where σ > 0, rt
n is the short-term natural real rate of interest, and Rt is the short-term 
nominal interest rate. 
 
Policy rule (assumed to be a Taylor-type rule, incorporating a response to the model-
consistent output gap): 
 
Rt = Rt* + φπ(πt – π*) + φy log(Yt / Yt
n),             (3) 
 
where Rt* is a time-varying intercept term, and φπ > 1, φy ≥ 0.
10 
 
Money demand equation: 
 
(mt – pt) = c0 + c1 log Yt + c2Rt + ηt ,                       (4) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
state inflation rate, it attributes too much knowledge on the part of policymakers to label the resulting 
series their “target.”  
9 For example, he disputes my (2003) interpretation of McCallum (2001), who assumed a constant inflation 
target. 
10 The assumption that φπ > 1 follows McCallum’s (2001) exposition of the New Keynesian model.  It is a 
special case of the analysis in Woodford (2007), where equilibrium is obtained under the assumption that a 
weighted combination of φπ and φy is sufficiently large.  This more general formulation reflects the 
recognition that under sticky prices, responses to the output gap can substitute for responses to inflation.   10
where (mt – pt) is log real balances, c1 > 0, c2 < 0, and ηt is a zero-mean money demand 
shock.  While Woodford’s (2007) framework can accommodate economic growth, I 
assume here that output does not have a trend. 
 
As this loglinear system has explicit constant (or time-varying intercept) terms, long-run 
solutions for variables can be derived from the equations.  Woodford argues that the last 
equation (the money demand equation) is not required to study the determination of 
steady-state inflation.  To see his argument, one first needs to decompose the intercept of 
the monetary policy rule.  Woodford (2007, p. 8) defines the intercept as the central 
bank’s “estimate of where the intercept needs to be in order for this policy rule to be 
consistent with the inflation target”; if the central bank’s estimate of the steady-state 
natural rate is accurate, the long-run value of this intercept is E[Rt*] = E[rt
n] + π* where 
π* is the constant inflation target.  Then equations (1)−(3) in steady state imply: 
 
Ε[πt] = π*.                     (5) 
 
E[log Yt] = E[log Yt
n] .                     ( 6 )  
 
E[Rt*] = E[rt
n] + π*.                              (7) 
 
These conditions indicate that steady-state inflation is equal to the policy-determined 
inflation target; that output is equal to its natural level; and that the steady-state policy 
rule devolves into a steady-state Fisher condition, with inflation equal to the inflation 
target.  So there are three unknowns—i.e., the expectations of the endogenous variables 
πt, log Yt, and Rt on the left-hand sides of conditions (5)-(7)—matched by three equations 
giving solutions for each of these unknowns in terms of exogenous variables. 
 
The system is self-contained, leaving the money demand function redundant.  In 
particular, equations other than the money demand function feature the inflation-target 
term, and the money demand function is not needed to obtain expression (5) where 
inflation is equal in the long run to the exogenous policy target.  The money demand 
equation adds one equation and one unknown, so can be dropped altogether, or can be 
thought of as determining steady-state log real money balances, E[(m − p)t], or steady-
state nominal money growth (E[μt] ≡ E[Δmt]), given determination of the inflation rate 
using the other equations. 
   11
Woodford emphasizes that in addition to appearing in the Phillips curve, π* also appears 
in the intercept of the interest-rate rule that describes monetary policy behavior.  Steady-
state inflation can therefore be derived using this rule in conjunction with the IS and 
Phillips curve relations.  According to this critique, there is no distinction between the 
dynamics of inflation and steady-state inflation as far as the status of money is concerned; 
the money demand function is not required in either case to solve for inflation.  
Therefore, New Keynesian models that omit money are self-contained in the sense that 
steady-state inflation, not just the dynamics around the steady state, is determined within 
the system.  Or as Woodford (2007, p. 13) puts it, “the trend inflation rate… is also 
determined within the system: it corresponds to the central bank’s target rate, 
incorporated into the policy rule…”  According to this argument, while monetary policy 
indeed determines long-run inflation, money growth has no role that emerges in the long 
run; money growth, it is claimed, is not what pins down steady-state inflation, and those 
that contend otherwise are guilty of a misunderstanding. 
 
But Woodford has not established such a misunderstanding, and on further consideration 
I reaffirm that money growth does have the role attributed to it by myself and others.  
Establishing this point does not involve denying or overturning the counting-equations-
and-unknowns procedure described above.  Instead, it arises from a consideration of how 
the steady state of a model used for monetary policy behaves. 
 
A useful way to confront the issues involved is to consider the following quotation from 
Bernanke (2003): 
 
You may have noted that I did not include money growth in this list of inflation 
determinants.  Ultimately, inflation is a monetary phenomenon, as suggested by 
Milton Friedman’s famous dictum.  However, no contradiction exists, as the 
expectational Phillips curve is fully consistent with inflation’s being determined 
by monetary forces in the long run.  This point, originally made by Friedman 
himself, has been demonstrated in many textbooks and so I will not discuss it 
further here. 
 
This passage raises several points that are germane to the present discussion.  First, it 
shows that the view that money growth determines inflation in the long run is not 
something likely to be embraced only by those unfamiliar with the properties of modern 
models; it is held by someone who has worked on New Keynesian models with   12
Woodford (see Bernanke and Woodford, 1997).  Second, the reference to “monetary 
forces” rather than “money growth” is not really denying money growth center stage for 
long-run analysis, since Bernanke is explicitly tying the statement to both textbooks and 
Friedman’s work, which both refer to monetary aggregates.  Third, the reference to 
“many textbooks” suggests that the considerations that lead to the position that money 
growth determines inflation come from model properties that are common to both New 
Keynesian models and more traditional, textbook models—in particular, from steady-
state properties of the models.   
 
It is the third of these points that I pursue in the remainder of this section.  In the spirit of 
Bernanke’s reference to “many textbooks,” my answer to the Woodford critique relies on 
propositions about the steady state that are common to both textbook macroeconomics 
and the New Keynesian model.  As intermediate steps, it is worth spelling out an explicit 
definition of the “long run” (Section 3.2) and considering the properties of the economy 
consistent with this long run (Section 3.3). 
 
3.2 Defining the long run 
 
What is the appropriate definition of the “long run” in monetary policy analysis?  Almost 
tautologically, the “long run” is the steady state of a model
11 or, equivalently, the version 
of the economy that pertains when unconditional expectations (where they exist) are 
taken of model variables.  But prominent discussions in the literature, discussed below, 
allow more economic content to be put into the discussion of “long run,” while still 
producing definitions that are consistent with interpreting the “long run” as referring to 
the steady state or to unconditional means. 
 
Specifically, there is support for the following position: In monetary analysis, the long 
run is defined as the economic conditions prevailing after prices have fully adjusted to 
monetary policy actions.  For example, Baumol and Blinder (1982, p. 301), having, as 
noted above, brought the natural rate hypothesis into their framework, described the 
“vertical (long-run) Phillips curve” as the position to which the economy reverted as a 
result of its “self-correcting mechanism,” consisting of gradual adjustment of wages and 
———————————————————————————————————— 
11 For example, McCallum (1990, p. 988) notes that the “long run” is a “concept… presumably related to 
steady-state properties.”  This is a rare case of the two concepts being explicitly linked; many other 
discussions, however, could be cited where “long run” and “steady state” implicitly are taken to be 
interchangeable concepts, and the present discussion does so.   13
prices to a monetary policy action.  The “long run” accordingly corresponds to the state 
of the economy prevailing after any inertia in nominal prices and wages has passed.  In 
the context of the preceding Phillips curve (1), the process of price adjustment tends to 
close the output gap and to line up the path of inflation with the path of the steady-state 
inflation rate πt*. 
 
The corollary of this conception of “long run” is that price stickiness is a temporary—that 
is, short-run—phenomenon.  That perspective is made explicit in a description of wage 
and price stickiness given by John Taylor: 
 
One of the central reasons that the economy departs from the natural rate for 
prolonged periods is the existence of nominal wage and price rigidities that 
prevent the economy from adjusting quickly to disturbances.  But these wage and 
price rigidities are temporary; they lead to temporary fluctuations in 
employment… Eventually the economy tends to return to the natural rate of 
unemployment, and (on average) unemployment is equal to the natural rate. 
(Taylor, 1987, p. 351.) 
 
Taylor’s perspective is consistent with other discussions of sticky-price models that are 
restricted to satisfy the natural rate hypothesis.
12 For example, the classic analysis of 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1978, p. 347), states that “[w]e should expect to converge to the 
neoclassical equilibrium in the long run,” but that “in the short run… stickiness of wages 
and prices… will affect the adjustment process.” 
 
As price stickiness is a temporary phenomenon, it should not be assumed to hold when 
studying steady-state behavior.  Analyzing the long run, including the long-run 
determination of inflation, implies analyzing conditions where prices have adjusted fully 
to monetary policy actions. 
 
———————————————————————————————————— 
12 I.e., the restriction that the economy converges to the flexible-price steady state, so that the mean value of 
output in the sticky-price model coincides with the mean of output of a flexible-price version of the 
economy.  In this discussion, I further assume that the mean values of output and real interest rate in the 
flexible-price economy (and so the mean values in the sticky-price model too) are invariant to different 
monetary policy rules and different inflation rates, implying that there is no violation of superneutrality.  
See McCallum (1990, 2004) for further discussion of superneutrality.   14
3.3 Economic conditions in the long run  
 
The short-run/long-run distinction has important implications for the ability of the central 
bank to affect interest rates.  The mechanism through which monetary policy actions 
(open market operations) have their usual effect on interest rates relies on price 
stickiness, and so wears off in the long run.  Abel and Bernanke (1992) observe that it is 
nominal rigidity that allows manipulation of the real interest rate by open market 
operations in the short run: 
 
[B]ecause of slow price adjustment… monetary expansion causes output and 
employment to rise and the real interest rate to fall… (1992, p. 139.) 
 
But they note that the impact on real interest rates wears off in the long run: 
 
[A]fter the adjustment of the price level, [an] increase in the nominal money 
supply has had no effect on output or the real interest rate… [There is] monetary 
neutrality in the long run (after prices adjust) but not in the short run.  (1992, pp. 
138, 139.) 
 
The observation that central banks cannot influence real interest rates in the long run has 
a venerable history, with Humphrey (1983, p. 15) offering an 1819 quotation from David 
Ricardo in which the latter argued that a central bank can “not permanently alter the 
market rate of interest.”  Early discussions like Ricardo’s were flawed by their neglect of 
the expected-inflation component of nominal interest rates.  When the Fisher effect on 
nominal interest rates is allowed for, central banks can “permanently alter” nominal 
interest rates by taking actions that permanently lower inflation.  This possibility is 
considered further below.  But the key point that real interest rates cannot be influenced 
by monetary authorities does endure from Ricardo’s work and remains a property of 
textbook models, as the Abel-Bernanke quotation attests, and the New Keynesian model 
studied by Woodford (2007).  Open market operations are not available as a long-run 
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3.4 The answer to Woodford’s critique 
 
With this background established, I can now present the answer to Woodford’s critique.
13 
In opposition to my characterization of steady-state inflation as pinned down by steady-
state money growth, Woodford emphasizes the fact that the intercept term of the 
monetary authority’s interest-rate rule includes an inflation-target component.  My 
emphasis on money growth as the determinant of inflation in the long run, however, was 
not meant to imply a denial on my part that the interest-rate rule incorporates an inflation 
target.  In fact, as Woodford notes, my discussion was accompanied by a citation of 
McCallum (2001), who wrote down an interest-rate rule with an inflation-target term as 
part of the intercept.
14 The issue is not money growth vs. the rule intercept as 
determinants of inflation, but whether appealing to the intercept term gives a deep enough 
answer.  My contention is that pointing to the intercept does not deliver a satisfying 
answer to the question of how a central bank determines inflation in the long run. 
 
To describe the long-run determination of inflation, one must, as discussed above, 
consider the properties of the economy in steady state.  Whereas my focus was on the 
money growth/inflation connection that can be derived from the steady-state money 
demand function, Woodford’s approach is to treat the short-term nominal interest rate as 
a choice variable—a policy instrument—in the long run.  Alternatively, he could be 
regarded as treating the steady-state inflation rate as a policy instrument in the long run.  
Under either interpretation, Woodford is making a high-level assumption.  My less high-
level approach involves considering the behavior of the economy in steady state, the 
curbs that exist in the steady-state economy on the power of monetary policy to affect 
real variables, and the central bank’s continuing power to affect nominal variables in that 
steady state.  That continuing power does give the central bank the ability to determine 
inflation and the nominal interest rate in the long run, but not in such a direct manner that 
either should be treated as a policy instrument. 
———————————————————————————————————— 
13 The argument developed here appeared in skeletal form in Nelson (2007). 
14 Woodford contends that my interpretation “is not an obvious reading of what McCallum (2001) actually 
says.”  Perhaps not, but I did not refer to McCallum (2001) in isolation; I cited both McCallum (1990) and 
McCallum (2001).  McCallum (1990) discusses the Friedman (1963) view of inflation as a monetary 
phenomenon, argues that Friedman’s view implies that long-run money growth determines steady-state 
inflation, and endorses that view.  The cited passage of McCallum (2001), on the other hand, rejects the 
view that inflation is a nonmonetary phenomenon in the long run in New Keynesian models.  If inflation is 
not a nonmonetary phenomenon, it is a monetary phenomenon.  So McCallum’s rejection in 2001 of the 
view that inflation is a nonmonetary phenomenon means that his 1990 interpretation of inflation as a 
monetary phenomenon, with its emphasis on money growth, can be taken as applicable.   16
To bring out the role of money, let’s write the steady-state money demand function in 
first differences: 
 
E[μt] = E[πt] + c1E[Δ log Y t] + c2E[ΔR t]. 
 
In the steady state, models like Woodford’s satisfy the generic monetary neutrality 
feature highlighted in the Abel-Bernanke (1992) passage quoted above; output and real 
interest rates are equal in the long run to their steady-state natural values—both of them 
constant here.  Accordingly, E[Δ log Y t] = E[Δ log Yt
n] = 0 and the expectation of the 
change in the real rate is zero.  Moreover, my assumption of a constant steady-state 
inflation rate makes E[Δπt] and so E[ΔR t] zero, with the consequence that the preceding 
long-run first-differenced money demand condition becomes 
 
E[μt] – c1E[Δ log Yt
n] = E[πt],                  (8) 
 
implying that the inflation rate and the rate of growth in nominal money have a one-for-
one long-run relationship, adjusted, as usual in quantity-theory analysis, for steady-state 
growth in potential output.  (Average growth in potential is typically nonzero in actual 
data; I keep the c1E[Δ log Yt
n] term in equation (8) as a reminder of this general case, 
though it is zero under the assumption of no output trend.) 
 
The steady-state system therefore consists of equations (5), (6), (7), and (8).  How have 
things changed in the steady state compared to the dynamic case?  As discussed in 
Section 3.1, they have not changed in a mathematical sense.  We still have a self-
contained system of three equations in y, R and π plus a fourth equation (the money 
demand equation) relating these variables (or, in steady state, a subset of them) to money.  
But, economically, things have changed.  Mechanical application of the analysis of the 
dynamic model to the steady-state case requires treating the R equation (7) as a policy 
rule.  Equation (7), however, is a steady-state version of the Fisher equation, with the 
real-rate term exogenous.  So treatment of the R equation as a policy rule now requires 
taking the position that R is a policy instrument in (7) (as in the dynamic equation) or that 
π is a policy instrument. 
 
But I believe that neither position is really tenable.  I believe that the condition 
 
E[Rt*] = E[rt
n] + π*         ( 9 )    17
cannot be regarded as an equation determining E[Rt*] in terms of policy variables unless 
one explains how the central bank enforces its inflation target π*.  That is, one should 
explain how the central bank makes the inflation rate equal to its desired rate.  Likewise, 
it is not satisfactory to rearrange the condition to 
 
π* = E[Rt*] − E[rt
n]         ( 1 0 )  
 
and then claim that the equation is solving for target inflation in terms of the policy 
variable E[Rt*].  Such a claim can be justified only when accompanied by an explanation 
for how the policymaker can control the nominal interest rate in the long run.  And here 
one must bear in mind that from the propositions given above, its short-run method of Rt 
control is unavailable in the long run. 
 
It is a short-run deviation from monetary neutrality, arising from the temporary nominal 
rigidities, that allows New Keynesian modelers to treat Rt as a policy instrument, and the 
Rt equation as a policy rule, in the equations describing variables’ dynamics.  In the short 
run, with gradual price adjustment, open market operations are not met by a complete, 
instantaneous reaction of the price level.  Consequently, these operations, on impact, not 
only affect nominal balances, but also real balances in the same direction.  An 
enlargement of real money balances in turn produces an Rt fall—the liquidity effect—in 
order for the money demand equation to be satisfied; conversely, Rt rises in the case of a 
reduction in real balances.  The monetary authority is able to affect both real and nominal 
interest rates via the liquidity effect produced by the change in real balances.  In these 
circumstances, it is legitimate to follow the standard practice of studying dynamic 
systems which make Rt (or Rt relative to its steady-state value) the policy instrument, and 
then (assuming that the interest-rate rule features no reaction to money) the money 
demand equation assumes its familiar status of a redundant condition.  But in the long 
run, things change: nominal price stickiness dissipates completely; monetary neutrality 
prevails; prices move by the same percentage as the nominal money stock; the 
determination of real money balances is separate from that of nominal balances; and the 
liquidity effect is gone. 
 
Thus the behavior of the economy in steady state is characterized by Milton Friedman’s 
observation, “The central bank cannot determine interest rates except by producing   18
inflation.”
15 This observation is reflected in textbook analysis—implicitly in the Abel-
Bernanke (1992) quotations above, and explicitly in other textbook discussions, such as 
Ritter and Silber’s (1983, p. 431) statement that under price flexibility (and so in the 
steady state of any sticky-price model that satisfies the natural rate hypothesis), “A 
change in the money supply cannot alter the real rate; it can only influence nominal rates 
by changing inflationary expectations.”  Accordingly, the task for a monetary policy 
analyst interested in steady-state inflation determination is to describe how central bank 
actions determine the long-run expectation of inflation when they cannot affect the real 
interest rate. 
 
We therefore come to why the steady-state inflation rate is pinned down by steady-state 
money growth.  Though they no longer affect real interest rates, and no longer can affect 
nominal rates via a liquidity effect, the central bank’s open market operations continue in 
the long run to affect nominal money growth.  So nominal money growth is 
unambiguously susceptible to central bank influence even in the long run.  The preceding 
steady-state money demand equation consequently provides the guide for hitting a 
desired inflation rate π*.  Reaching that inflation target means a specified quantity of 
open market operations in the steady state; specifically, open market operations that 
deliver a steady-state money growth of μ* ≡ π* + c1E[Δ log Yt
n].  There it is: the sense in 
which steady-state inflation can be regarded as pinned down by steady-state money 
growth.  It is not a denial of the long-run nominal interest-rate equation, but instead is an 
account of how the central bank makes the nominal variables in that condition take the 
values that the central bank wants. 
 
The interdependent positions that (a) long-run money growth determines long-run 
inflation, and (b) the monetary authority cannot treat the nominal interest rate as an 
instrument in the long run, are widely shared.  It is common to find in discussions by 
policymakers and policy advisors statements to the effect that the short-term nominal 
interest rate is not a variable permanently at their disposal as an instrument, but rather, in 
keeping with the preceding discussion, a variable that is a policy instrument only in the 
short run.  To this end, a particularly notable statement is that of Goodhart (1992, p. 315): 
a “central bank’s control over short-term interest rates… is relatively short, in terms of 
weeks, quarters or a few years.  In the long term, nominal interest rates will be 
———————————————————————————————————— 
15 Quoted in Crawford (1970).  There, Friedman added that he was referring to the case where “you want 
the central bank to affect interest rates over more than the immediate short-term period”; that is, to long-run 
control of the interest rate.    19
determined by real (international) forces and the expected rate of inflation.”  Another 
quotation that goes to the heart of the matter is due to then-Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis President Darryl Francis, who said in 1973: “It is wrong to accept at face value the 
statement [that] the ‘Fed can control interest rates’ without the corresponding explanation 
of how the Fed can do this…” (Francis, 1973, pp. 8−9.)  Francis might have added that 
such an explanation is especially needed for the study of long-run interest-rate and 
inflation determination. 
 
This does not preclude using frameworks like Woodford’s that refer to the inflation target 
in the interest-rate rule as the determinant of steady-state inflation; rather, what needs to 
be kept in mind is that such an approach is a shortcut or abstraction that takes for granted 
the underlying operations involving money on the part of the central bank that secure 
long-run control of the interest rate and inflation. 
 
Even if one is satisfied with viewing the inflation-target portion of the interest-rate rule as 
what determines the steady-state inflation rate, and wishes to implement this approach 
empirically, one must face the fact that the inflation target is often not measured directly.  
Information from monetary aggregates might be valuable in this context.  Episodes in the 
U.S. experience suggest that estimates of the long-run inflation rate implied by Federal 
Reserve policy would be improved by allowing data on monetary aggregates to affect the 
estimates.  For example, Ireland’s (2007, Figure 4) inflation-target series, estimated from 
interest-rate, output, and inflation data, suggests that the steady-state inflation rate leveled 
off and fell slightly over 1971 and 1972.  This presumably reflects the impact on the 
target estimate of the combination of rises in the short-term interest rate and declines in 
measured inflation during 1972.  But actually monetary policy was very expansionary in 
1972, and inflation was being held down by price controls.  Correctly measured steady-
state inflation rate rose in 1972, and consideration of data on money growth—rapid 
during 1972—would have helped move Ireland’s estimate of steady-state inflation in the 
right direction.  Likewise, data on money growth are revealing about periods (such as the 
1980 credit-controls episode) in which monetary policy is tight but interest rates are 
nevertheless falling sharply. 
 
4.  Clarifications and objections 
 
It is useful to clarify the argument outlined above by highlighting some distinctions from 
other discussions of interest-rate rules in the literature.  In this section, I emphasize that   20
my argument does not have anything to do with appealing to the danger of multiple 
model equilibria (Section 4.1).  It is also important to consider the changing status of the 
IS equation when one is studying the long run (Section 4.2).  Finally, Section 4.3 points 
out some discontinuities between sticky-price models and flexible-price models such as 
the one studied by Woodford (2003, Chapter 2). 
 
4.1 Feasibility is the problem, not indeterminacy 
 
My opposition to representing steady-state monetary policy as an interest-rate setting 
decision does not rest on any appeal to the possibility of multiple equilibria.
16 In fact, 
there is no danger of multiple model solutions in the steady state studied above.  From 
inspection of equation (9), it is clear that no uniqueness problems exist: given the steady-
state inflation rate π*, E[Rt*] has a unique value, since the difference between them (the 
steady-state natural real interest rate) is an exogenous constant.  The problem is instead 
the inadequacy of the level of explanation.  Simply assuming that the mean of the 
nominal interest rate can be selected by the central bank is hardly a satisfying basis for 
describing determination of mean inflation.  On the contrary, it begs the question of how 
the central bank determines long-run inflation.  As discussed above, long-run monetary 
policy influence on the nominal interest rate is not possible other than via policy’s 
influence on long-run inflation, so explaining long-run inflation outcomes as the result of 
an interest-rate choice is inadequate. 
 
The argument outlined in Section 3.4 above therefore differs from critiques of interest-
rate rules or of interest-rate pegging because mine is not a claim about the undesirable 
consequences of certain interest-rate policies.  Instead, it is a neutrality claim that denies 
the feasibility of affecting interest rates in the long run, other than through the Fisher 
effect.  This neutrality result rules out viewing interest rates as a long-run policy 
instrument.  Money growth, on the other hand, is a variable that the central bank can view 
as an instrument in the long run, and its long-run influence on inflation and interest rates 




16 See instead Christiano and Rostagno (2001) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) for analyses of 
the interaction between multiple-equilibria problems and the role of money in monetary policy.  In 
particular, these authors argue that policymaking strategies that assign a role to money can help avoid 
multiple equilibria of the sort claimed by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) to arise from interest-
rate rules.   21
4.2 Interest rates and aggregate demand 
 
The perspective offered here on money’s role in the long run is not simply a version of 
the point that behind the determination of aggregate demand by interest rates, there are 
open market operations supporting the central bank’s chosen interest rate.  That point is 
frequently made in characterizing dynamics in the three-equation New Keynesian 
dynamic model, and is consistent with the money demand equation being redundant.
17  
That particular point, however, does not carry through to the long run; indeed, the 
equation connecting aggregate demand to interest rates (the IS equation) has no terms 
that monetary policy can affect in the long run.  The Euler equation that underpins the IS 
equation implies a relation connecting steady-state economic growth and the steady-state 
real short-term interest rate,
18 neither of which monetary policy can affect.  To find where 
steady-state inflation is determined, one must look at other steady-state conditions.  In 
this regard, Woodford points to the intercept of the interest-rate policy rule.  I argue that 
such a perspective is a shortcut, in the absence of a story of how the central bank can 
affect the interest rate in the long run—given that its main short-run manner of influence 
(the liquidity effect of open market operations) is absent in the long run.   
 
4.3 Dichotomy between flexible-price and sticky-price models 
 
The argument made here about long-run inflation determination rests on an asymmetry 
between the central bank’s power over interest rates under sticky prices and under 
flexible prices (and therefore, in the long run of a sticky-price model).  Woodford (2003, 
Chapter 2) analyzes interest-rate rules in a flexible-price model before moving to sticky-
price models in the rest of his monograph.  Does that mean that my claimed dichotomy 
between flexible-price and sticky-price models is invalid?  The answer is no.  The central 
bank’s means of affecting interest rates are different in a flexible-price model.   
Consequently, specifying monetary policy in terms of an interest-rate rule when prices 
are flexible amounts to a high-level assumption (or shortcut) in a way that the same 
specification in a sticky-price model is not. 
———————————————————————————————————— 
17 It is not sufficiently appreciated that the redundancy of the money demand equation in solving for 
inflation and output dynamics under interest-rate rules is not a feature that makes New Keynesian models 
different from earlier model generations.  In fact, the same redundant status pertained to money demand 
functions in traditional IS-LM analysis under interest-rate rules, a point that Christiano, Motto, and 
Rostagno (2007, pp. 3−4) make very clearly. 
18 Obtaining this condition involves using a standard resource constraint to substitute output for 
consumption.   22
In Woodford’s (2003) Chapter 2, as in other flexible-price environments such as Barro 
(1989), the ex ante real interest rate is exogenous, and the only way the central bank can 
control the interest rate is via the Fisher effect.  For example, in Woodford (2003, 
Chapter 2, p. 97), the real interest rate is assumed to follow an AR(1) process, in keeping 
with its exogenous status.  Key properties of the New Keynesian model analyzed in 
Woodford (2003, 2007)—e.g. the central bank’s ability to influence real interest rates—
do not have counterparts in his (2003, Chapter 2) model.   
 
Thus in Woodford’s (2003, Chapter 2) framework it is possible to write the (linearized) 
Fisher equation, Rt = Etπt+1 + rt (with rt being the real interest rate) as 
 
Rt = Etπt+1 + t.i.p.              ( 1 1 )  
 
where, as in Woodford (2003, p. 395), “t.i.p.” denotes “terms independent of policy.”  In 
a sticky-price model such as that in Woodford (2007), however, such a representation of 
the Fisher equation is not admissible: rather  
 
Rt ≠  Etπt+1 + t.i.p ,           ( 1 2 )  
 
because the dynamics of the real interest rate are not independent of monetary policy.  In 
the sticky-price model, then, Rt is susceptible to central bank influence for given Etπt+1; 
whereas in the flexible-price model the only way the central bank can control Rt is by 
control of Etπt+1.  Woodford’s (2003, Chapter 2) model therefore has the property of 
flexible-price models described in the Ritter-Silber (1983) observation given above, a 
property shared, as noted, with the steady state of any sticky-price model that satisfies the 
natural rate hypothesis.   
 
The dichotomy between sticky-price and flexible-price models is illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2.  Figure 1 describes the period-t reaction of interest rates and money to an 
expansionary open-market purchase in a typical sticky-price model (including standard 
New Keynesian models).  The signs of responses depicted in this figure would be those 
typically associated with a positive exogenous shock to a univariate money growth rule.
19 
———————————————————————————————————— 
19 In the case of sticky prices, they also correspond to the sign responses associated with an open market 
purchase designed to deliver an expansionary shock to an interest-rate policy rule.  The real rate, nominal 
rate, and inflation sign responses, for example, are consistent with the impact effects of a monetary policy 
shock implied by the “ρ = 0.6” parameterization in Woodford (2003, Figure 4.8, p. 283).   23
Underlying the figure are standard assumptions that (a) the expansion is expected to be 
followed by another expansionary action in the following period (and so makes period-t 
expectations of period-t+1 nominal money growth higher than they would be in the 
absence of the expansionary action),
20 and (b) the liquidity effect on the nominal interest 
rate initially outweighs the Fisher effect on the nominal interest rate.  The expansionary 
open market operation is associated with an expansion of nominal and real money 
balances, higher inflation expectations for period t+1, and with declines in the nominal 
and real interest rate.
21 
 
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding sequence in a flexible-price model.  There is no 
central bank influence on real interest rates even in the short run, and the central bank’s 
scope for affecting nominal interest rates is limited to the Fisher effect.  The open market 
purchase does not produce a short-run expansion of real money balances; in fact, the 
Fisher effect on nominal interest rates will increase the opportunity cost of holding real 
balances and lead households to reduce their real money holdings (the reduction, in 
aggregate, being achieved by an upward shift in the price level).  Since Figure 2 describes 
Woodford’s (2003, Chapter 2) model, it is clear that there are limitations on the central 
bank’s power over interest rates in that model that are not present in the short run of a 
sticky-price model.  In particular, in both the short run and the long run of a flexible-price 
model, the only influence the monetary authority can exert on nominal interest rates is by 
affecting the expected-inflation portion of the nominal interest rate. 
 
The contrast between Figures 1 and 2 is underscored by considering standard descriptions 
of the transmission mechanism.  Ramey (1993, p. 2) describes the standard view of the 
transmission mechanism as one where central bank injections of nominal base money 
also initially raise the quantity real base money; the increase in the latter induces a 
decline in the nominal interest rate; and the decline in the nominal rate contributes to a 
decline in the real rate.  As Ramey notes, this view of the transmission mechanism rests 
on the existence of price stickiness.  All of her description carries through to the 
adjustment process in Woodford’s (2007) model, which has nominal rigidity.  None of it 
———————————————————————————————————— 
20 This assumption would be appropriate, for example, if the monetary policy rule was a stationary AR(1) 
money growth rule with positive AR parameter. 
21 The figure depicts the behavior within a single period of several simultaneously determined endogenous 
variables.  The arrows employed in the figure serve, as in (e.g.) Dornbusch and Fisher (1978, p. 362), to lay 
out how monetary policy transmission works in the model; they do not depict a timing sequence.  Note also 
that while higher money growth tends, as indicated, to raise expected inflation in both sticky-price and 
flexible-price models, in the former case this typically occurs via an output-gap channel (see e.g. Svensson, 
2001, p. 15).   24
Figure 1. Reaction of period-t variables and period-t expectations to period-t  















Figure 2. Reaction of period-t variables and period-t expectations to period-t 
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Table 1. Comparison of properties of Woodford (2003, Chapter 2) and  
Woodford (2007) models 
  Characteristics of: 
  Woodford (2007) sticky-price 
model with monetary frictions 
Woodford (2003, Ch. 2) 
flexible-price model with 
monetary frictions 
   Dynamics 
near steady 
state 




Can monetary policy affect 
real interest rate? 
Yes No No No 
Does open market purchase 
reduce nominal interest rate? 
Yes No No No 
Do open market operations 
affect money growth? 




carries through to the model in Woodford (2003, Chapter 2), because that model has no 
nominal rigidity. 
 
Woodford’s (2007) model in the long run has the same limitations on central bank power 
as those that prevail every period in a flexible-price economy.  This is brought out in 
Table 1, which reworks elements of Figures 1 and 2 and also states steady-state 
properties of the Woodford (2003, Chapter 2) and Woodford (2007) models.  The steady-
state properties listed for Woodford’s (2007) model coincide with the properties (both in 
steady state and for dynamics near steady state) of the flexible-price model.  In particular, 
as one moves from the short run to the long run in a sticky-price model, one reaches a 
situation where open market operations cannot influence the real interest rate but can still 
influence money growth, and these operations can only influence nominal interest rates 
via affecting inflation.  The link between open market operations and inflation as 
recorded in the (first-differenced) steady-state money demand equation accordingly 
assumes importance as one moves to long-run analysis. 
 
Therefore, unless one is satisfied with the high-level assumption that the central bank can 
treat Etπt+1 as a policy instrument, one must see the interest-rate rule in a flexible-price 
model as derived from the influence on Etπt+1 of the only variable that is a bona fide 
policy instrument in the long run: money growth.  The fact that Woodford (2003) looks at 
both sticky-price and flexible-price models thus does not mean that all interest-rate 
results carry across both models.  In particular, the underlying mechanism for central   26
bank influence on interest rates is distinct in flexible-price models, with these models 
implying exclusive reliance on the Fisher effect for interest-rate control.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
To summarize, Woodford’s (2007) analysis is algebraically correct but rests on high-level 
assumptions about the central bank’s long-run control of the interest rate.  By contrast, 
the proposition that inflation, in the long run, is determined by money growth, goes 
beneath those high-level assumptions and provides an underpinning for the conviction 
that the central bank can deliver the long-run inflation rate at its target value (and so 
deliver the corresponding implied nominal interest rate).    27
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